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Following a dividend distribution, investors expect the stock price to decrease on the 
ex-dividend day. With no market imperfections, the price decrease should exactly match the 
amount of the dividend, thus eliminating all opportunities for profitable arbitrage. Allowing 
for different taxes on dividends and on capital gains results in a stock price adjustment ratio 
different from one, but there is still a unique equilibrium. With a simple model, considering 
four types of investors, we show that the consideration of transaction costs results in multiple 
possible equilibria (equilibrium zone), defined by the arbitrage boundaries of each type of 
investors. We also show that trading activity by the different types of investors is reflected in 
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The model developed in this paper analyzes the equilibrium conditions for the stock 
price adjustment after a dividend distribution, in the context of imperfect markets, considering 
the existence of taxes and transaction costs, and assuming that arbitrage activity leads prices 
to equilibrium. This arbitrage model is inspired by the pioneering work of Elton and Gruber 
(1970) as well as other authors including Kalay (1982), Eades Hess and Kim (1984), 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) and Michaely (1991). 
An investor that sells his stock before the payment of the dividend looses the right to 
receive that dividend. If he sells his stock after the payment of the dividend, he receives the 
dividend but, under arbitrage, he expects the stock price to decrease to a level that would 
make him indifferent to sell before or after the dividend distribution. With no market 
imperfections, the price decrease would exactly match the amount of the dividend. If we 
allow for taxes and transaction costs in a market with rational arbitrage, the price decrease 
after the dividend event should reflect the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains, as 
well as the costs inherent to stock transactions. 
Several papers study the effect of dynamic trading strategies around the ex-dividend 
day. These strategies imply that investors trade around the ex-dividend day in order to avoid 
or to capture the dividend, depending on their preferences for dividends or capital gains. 
Kalay (1982) argued that, without risk or transaction costs, investors with the same taxes on 
dividends and capital gains would buy the stock cum-dividend and sell ex-dividend, forcing 
the stock price down by the amount of the dividend. This is consistent with the findings of 
Elton and Gruber (1970) because the marginal investors in the stock would be investors 
facing the same taxes on dividends and capital gains. Of course, the income tax of these 
arbitrageurs cannot be inferred, as proposed by Elton and Gruber (1970). Kalay (1982) 
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recognizes that transaction costs should be taken into consideration with the implication that 
the price adjustment ratio would no longer be constrained to being equal to one. The author 
argues that only within the boundaries defined by transaction costs would it be possible to 
infer the marginal investor’s income tax as beyond those limits the price change would be 
affected by arbitrage from investors seeking to take advantage of the opportunity to obtain 
excessive returns. Only within the boundaries defined by (3), there are no arbitrage 
opportunities. Miller and Scholes (1982) presented a similar argument in which the detected 
relationship between dividend yield and price change subsequent to a dividend distribution 
can be explained by short term trading as an alternative to the clientele effect explanation.  
Eades et al. (1984) studied the behavior of prices around the ex-dividend day and 
showed the existence of abnormal returns on days other than the ex-day. This is contrary to 
the tax-induced clientele hypothesis as the tax effect explains only the price change on the ex-
day and not the behavior of prices around the ex-day. The results of Kalay (1982) are 
consistent with the findings of Karpoff and Walking (1988) who detect a significant 
relationship between ex-day returns and transaction costs. Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) 
develop a model with different types of investors facing different transaction costs before 
showing how the relationship between the ex-day price change and dividend-yield is non-
linear. Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) confirm the presence of short-term traders in the 
market around the ex-dividend day, detectable because of high or abnormal volumes. These 
are more pronounced in high-yield stocks and Michaely and Vila (1995) set out an inverse 
relation between transaction costs and abnormal volume. The evidence of high or abnormal 
volumes around the ex-day is contrary to the static clientele models. Naranjo et al. (1998) re-
examined and extended the work of Eades et al. (1984) and find that the high-yield stock ex-
day returns are highly influenced by corporate dividend capture. Other insightful studies 
include Kadapakkam (2000), Bartholdy and Brown (2004) and Borges (2004).  
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The main contribution of our model is to extend theoretically on this discussion, by 
defining the equilibrium conditions for different types of investors, considering taxes, 
transaction costs and rational arbitrage. The general equilibrium will be defined by a range of 
potential equilibrium points (the equilibrium zone), that will depend on the relative weights of 
the different types of investors. We show that there is a relation between investor typologies 
and the pattern of trading volume in the dividend period, which may help identifying the types 




The hypotheses of the model are the following: (i) We assume that prices are 
stationary around the dividend event. This implies that daily returns are expected to be zero 
and that new information does not arrive to the market in that period. (ii) Investors maximize 
expected return, when deciding to buy or sell stocks. Any expected profit opportunity will be 
explored by investors. (iii) Investors are rational and form unbiased expectations about future 
prices. Investors do not commit systematic errors in their predictions about future price 
behavior. (iv) Investors are risk neutral. Decisions to buy and sell are only determined by 
expected returns. Between two alternatives, investors will always choose that which has 
higher expected return, independently of risk. Investors are indifferent between two 
alternative strategies if they have the same expected return, whatever the risk of each 
alternative. (v) Information is public and free. In the dividend period, all investors are fully 
informed about the dividend amount, the distribution date, transaction costs, and taxation on 
dividends and capital gains. 
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Under these hypotheses, and considering the absence of taxes and transaction costs, 
there is market equilibrium when the expected price adjustment on the ex-day equals the 












DPPR  (2) 
where Re is the expected return, Pb is the stock price before the dividend, Pea is the expected 
stock price after the dividend and D is the dividend. Allowing for market imperfections, 
namely taxes and transaction costs, we add three other assumptions to our model: (vi) 
Dividends are taxed, and the tax rate is assumed to be equal for all investors. (vii) Capital 
gains are also taxed, and the tax rate is assumed to be equal for all investors. (viii) Every buy 
or sell transaction has a positive transaction cost tax, independent of the trading volume, and 
equal for all investors. With these additional assumptions, the equilibrium conditions (1) and 
(2) are no longer valid, as will be shown in the next sections. 
 
Effects from the Behavior of Different Types of Investors 
 
The price adjustment after the dividend event will depend on the types of investors 
that are present in the market during the dividend period. We consider four types of investors. 
The first two have already made the decision to buy or to sell the stock, independently of the 
dividend event. Investors type S want to sell, while investors type B have decided to buy 
stocks. These investors now have only to decide the timing of the transaction, before or after 
the dividend. The other two types of investors are arbitrageurs that will decide to make a 
round-trip transaction, if they expect to obtain a positive return. Investors type BS buy stocks 
before the dividend and sell them after, while investors type SB hold stocks in their portfolio 
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and consider selling before the distribution date and buy them again after the event. We 
assume that the actions of these four types of investors will force the stock price to adjust to a 
level where profit opportunities become inexistent, for all of them. We will now determine the 
equilibrium conditions for each type of investor. 
 
Investors Type S 
 
Investors type S will sell before the dividend distribution if the expected result is 
positive: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]−−−−++− cbcgtcbtcc PPttPtP 11   
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 0111 >−+−−−++− dceacgtceatcc tDPPttPtP  (3) 
where the new variables have the following meaning: Pc is the stock acquisition price, td is the 
dividend tax, tcg is the capital gains tax and ttc is the transaction cost tax. The first part of (3) is 
the net result of selling before the dividend, and the second part is the net result of selling 
















1  (4) 
If condition (4) holds, investors type S will prefer to sell before the dividend, forcing 
the price Pb to decrease. But if the inequality (4) is the opposite, investors type S will prefer to 
sell after the dividend, forcing Pea down. Arbitrage by this type of investors will force prices 
















1  (5) 
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Investors Type B 
 
Investors type B will buy stocks before the dividend, if they expect (6) to be positive: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]−−+−−+−− tcesbescgtcbd tPPPttPtD 111  (6) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 011 >−+−−+− tceseaescgtcea tPPPttP  
where, Pes is the price that these investors will sell the stock in the future1. From (6) we obtain 
















1  (7) 
Investors type B will buy stocks before the dividend if condition (7) holds, forcing Pb 
to increase. If inequality (7) does not hold, investors type B will buy stocks after the dividend 




















Investors Type BS 
 
Investors type BS are short term traders following a strategy of buying before the 
dividend and selling after, if they believe they can make a profit: 




adtcb PPttPtDtP  (9) 

























                                                 
1 Or we could think of Pes  as representing all future inflows from the stock, including dividends and capital 
gains. We do not need to worry about the precise calculation of Pev because this variable cancels out in (7), and it 
is independent from the investors decision to buy, or not. 
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If there is this an arbitrage opportunity, these investors will buy before the dividend, 
forcing an increase in Pb, and sell after the dividend, pushing down Pea. The combination of 
this opposite movements in prices will remove profit opportunities, until: 






















1  (11) 
 
Investors Type SB 
 
Finally, investors type SB will sell before the dividend and buy after, if the expected 
result of this behavior is higher than to the alternative of holding the stock in their portfolio: 
 ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )−−+−−+−+−−− tceseaescgtceacbcgtca tPPPttPPPttP 1)1()1(  
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 011 >−+−+−− tcesdcescg tPtDPPt  (12) 

























If this arbitrage opportunity exists, the actions of investors type SB force Pb to decrease and 























1  (14) 
 
Arbitrage and Equilibrium 
 
Boundaries to Arbitrage Opportunities 
 
Now we can look at the effects of the joint behavior of the four types of investors. If 
we assume that transaction costs are null (ttc=0) the condition for the nonexistence of profit 
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opportunities for each type of investor, given by (5), (8), (11) e (14), simplifies to the 
















1  (15) 
Positive transaction costs have, however, a significant impact on the equilibrium conditions, 
with different boundaries for the arbitrage opportunities. Figure 1 identifies profit 
opportunities for the different types of investors and the arrows show the impact of their 
actions on the expected price adjustment.  
 
Figure 1 





All boundaries are defined in relation to the central value given by (15). Between 
boundaries B and S, investors types S and B, force the price adjustment in opposite directions. 
The location of the equilibrium depends on the relative forces of the two types of investors, 




























For investors types SB and BS, there are no profit opportunities inside boundaries SB and BS, 













































Figure 1 assumes that (16) is narrower than (17). There is no general proof of this 
result. However, if we restrict ourselves to combinations of td, tcg, ttc and D/P which are close 
to values observed in the real world, interval (16) will be much smaller than interval (17). In 
Figure 2, using td=25%, tcg=15%, D/P=1%, interval (17) is more than 200 times wider than 
interval (16), for any transaction cost, ttc, between 0% and 5%. 
 
Figure 2 














































This result is not surprising, because transaction costs have a very different impact on 
investors type B and S, on one side, and investors BS and SB, on the other. While investors B 
and S only face costs from one transaction, investors SB and BS will pay the costs of two 
transactions. Furthermore, investors B and S compare two alternatives which imply, both of 
them, the costs from one transaction. Transaction costs is thus a fixed cost and almost 
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irrelevant for their decision. The difference in transaction costs, between their two 




If profit opportunities are totally explored the price adjustment will be inside 
boundaries S and B, where all points are a possible equilibrium solution. Here, the actions of 
investors S and B push the price in opposite directions, and the final equilibrium will depend 
on the relative strengths of these two types of investors. Note that none of the investors is 
individually in equilibrium, because profit opportunities have not been completely exhausted. 
In any case, both types of investors choose to delay buying/selling until after the dividend 
distribution. This means that, ceteris paribus, we should observe a positive abnormal 
transaction volume after the distribution event and a negative abnormal volume before. If the 
price adjustment falls outside boundaries S and B, this means that the actions of investors S 
and B are not sufficient to explore all profit opportunities, by reasons unrelated to taxes and 
transaction costs. This may happen if these types of investors exist in small numbers in the 
market, and so they would not have a strong enough influence over prices. 
Investors types BS and SB do not intervene if the price adjustment is within boundaries 
BS and SB. The profit opportunities for these investors exist only below boundary BS and 
above boundary SB, respectively. The activity of these investors will lead to abnormal 
transaction volume both before and after the dividend. An important aspect is the extreme 
sensitivity of arbitrage opportunities for investors SB and BS, to the dividend yield, when 
transaction costs are positive. If we take td=tcg, D/P=1% e ttc=0.5%, the transaction costs of a 
round-trip exactly match the amount of the dividend. With this scenario, profit opportunities 
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exist for investors BS if 0<− eab PP , and for investors SB if ( ) 2/ >− DPP eab . Figure 3 shows 
how boundaries SB and BS get wider as dividend yield lowers and transaction costs increase. 
 
Figure 3 









































Expected Pre-tax Returns in Equilibrium 
 
In equilibrium, after-tax returns are zero. With taxes and transaction costs, investors 
will demand positive pre-tax returns. We obtain these equilibrium pre-tax returns by equaling 
(5), (8), (11) and (14) to zero, for all types of investors: 













































































































These conditions are the minimum pre-tax returns demanded by investors, and occur 
when all arbitrage opportunities are exhausted. For investors types SB and BS, these 
conditions represent the minimum return demanded to enter the market. If the following 



































investor type BS will prefer not to enter the market. On the other hand, investor type SB will 



































Generally, expected pre-tax equilibrium returns will be positive if td>tcg, and negative 
if td<tcg, although we have to also consider transaction costs. Table I shows the impact on pre-
tax equilibrium returns for all types of investors, from changes in td, tcg, ttc and D/P. For all 
investors, expected pre-tax returns increase with the tax rate on dividends. Conversely, 
expected pre-tax returns will be lower as the tax on capital gains increases, for all investors 
except for type BS, where the sign is ambiguous. The impact of transaction costs is negative 
on the expected pre-tax return of investors S and SB, and positive on the expected pre-tax 
return of investors B and BS. Finally, the relationship between expected pre-tax returns and 
dividend yields will be positive for investors SB and BS, if cgd tt > , for investors S, if 
tccgd ttt +> , and for investors B, if tccgd ttt −> . Normally, tct  is much smaller than dt  
and cgt , so we will have a positive relationship between the expected pre-tax return and the 








Effects of Differential Taxation 
 
The previous analysis is based on the assumption that taxes are equal for all investors. 
If we assume that investors may face different tax rates, there are some interesting points to 
show. Consider cgd tt >  for all investors, except for investors type BS, who face equal tax 
rates, cgd tt = . With no transaction costs, arbitrage opportunities disappear for investors type 


















For all other investors, we will have: 
















Figure 4 shows the arbitrage boundaries under these assumptions. For transactions 
costs below A, there are divergent interests between investors BS and the other investors. 
While investors BS push the price toward 1, the other investors push the price towards e. The 
 15
final equilibrium will depend on the relative weight of all types of investors, but it will be 
located in the shadowed area at the left of A.   
 
Figure 4  






If transaction costs are between A and B, there will be divergent interests between investors 
BS, on one side, and investors S and B, on the other. Once again, equilibrium will depend on 
the relative weight of these investors and it will be located in the shadowed area between A 
and B. If transaction costs exceed B, we will have the same case as in the model with identical 
taxation for all investors, with the equilibrium located between boundaries B and S. This 
example illustrates conflicts of interest between different types of investors, resulting from 
different taxations. In the real world more complex equilibria certainly exist. This example is 
useful because it shows that it is possible to have a global equilibrium where none of the 
investors has explored all profit opportunities and so, is not individually in equilibrium. 
Another implication is that the income tax rate of the marginal investor can not be inferred 
from the price adjustment, as proposed by Elton and Gruber (1970). 
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Trading Volume in the Dividend Period 
 
The trading volume will be affected by the actions of the different types of investors. 
Depending on the equilibrium zone, we will observe different behaviors by investors, which 
will affect transaction volume in different ways, as is graphically shown in Figure 5.  
Let us consider the existence of profit opportunities for investors types BS and SB, that 
is, the price adjustment is expected to fall in Zones Ia or Ib. In this case, we observe a positive 
abnormal trading volume both before and after the dividend event, by these types of investors. 
Investors BS will be active in zone Ia, while investors SB will be active in zone Ib. If the price 
adjustment is expected to fall in zones Ia or IIa, investors B will anticipate transactions to 
before the dividend and this translates in abnormal positive volume before the dividend and 
negative after. Investors S will postpone their sales until after the dividend, thus having an 
opposite effect on abnormal trading volume. The combined effect on trading volume depends 
on the relative weights of the transactions made by these two types of investors. This rationale 
can be extended to equilibrium zones IIb and Ib, where investors B and S change positions, in 
terms of their impact on the abnormal trading volume, as investors B will sell after the 
dividend and investors S will buy before the dividend.  
Again the combined effect on abnormal trading volume is ambiguous as it depends on 
the relative weights of both types of investors. If the price adjustment is expected to fall in 
zone III, both investors types B and S postpone their transactions until after the dividend, thus 
causing a negative abnormal volume before the dividend and a positive abnormal volume 
after. Thus, the observation of the trading volume during the dividend period may be an 













With a simple model assuming very restrictive hypothesis, we show that the allowance 
for market imperfections such as taxes and transactions costs implies that there is not a unique 
equilibrium point for the level of stock price adjustment following a dividend distribution 
event, but rather there are many possible equilibria. The main reason for this is the fact that 
transaction costs limit the arbitrage opportunities and so there are boundaries below which (or 
above which) arbitrage becomes unprofitable and so there are no market forces pushing the 
price to a unique market equilibrium. 
In the real world, where the spectrum of investors is more diverse than the four types 
allowed for in the model, where: tax rates are different between investors; transaction costs 
may be different for different agents; preferences regarding the trade-off between risk and 
return are also heterogeneous; and arbitrage may be limited by infrequent trading, we should 
expect to observe much more complex equilibria, and a wider range of possible values for the 
stock price adjustment. 
Finally, and in the absence of direct data regarding the identification of the types of 
investors affecting the global equilibrium, we show that the observation of abnormal trading 
volume around the dividend event may give us some insights on the identification of which 
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